Fibre Channel and Security

Live Webcast August 27, 2019 10:00 AM PT



Today's Presenters



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About the FCIA

- The Fibre Channel Industry Association (FCIA) is a mutual benefit, non-profit, international organization of manufacturers, system integrators, developers, vendors, and industry professionals, and end users
 - Promotes the advancement of Fibre Channel technologies and products that conform to the existing and emerging T11 standards
 - Maintains resources and supports activities to ensure multi-vendor interoperability for hardware, interconnection, and protocol solutions
 - Provides promotion and marketing of FC solutions, educational awareness campaigns, hosting public interoperability demonstrations, and fosters technology and standards conformance

https://fibrechannel.org/




Key Discussion Points

- Industry trends driving data protection and security
- Existing SAN security mechanisms
- Potential data center security threats
- Fibre Channel authentication and encryption
- Protections provided by Fibre Channel security protocol
- Implementing FC encryption
- Trade offs and caveats



Drivers for Storage Security

Security and Privacy Sensitive Verticals





Isn't FC Secure Already?

Trusted Storage Interconnect for Decades

Physical Security

• Data Centers are physically secured

Segregation

• Fibre Channel SANs are segregated networks

Partitioning

• FC Zoning ensures fabric partitioning

Masking

LUN masking restricts access to specific LUNs

Management

Out-of-Band Management (IP) is secure, OS Controls



Yes, But...

New Data Center Architectures bring new threats

- Distributed data centers Remote replication and DR backups may be accessed by different users over Fabrics that span several sites
- Multi Tenant data centers Need to segregate and protect data traversing the same wire

Increasing scale of FC SANs

- Networks can be misconfigured
- Fabric configuration databases are shared (not restricted to zones), have WKAs

Existing mechanisms may not be enough

- Switches are the sole entity that grant/deny access
 - Authorization based
- "Segmentation" tools being used to implement "Security"
 - Soft zoning, LUN Masking




"Appropriate" Security

- No amount of security is "enough"
 - And no amount of security will "guarantee" protection
- Highly business- and technology-environment dependent
 - Balance between cost of protection technologies and business impact from lost data, credibility and its legal implications
- Users are highly advised to analyze their security needs
 - The FC / FC-NVMe / FICON protocol can't make that decision for you
 - A good data protection plan should define recovery strategies, RPO, and RTO
- Nothing in this presentation constitutes warranty or guarantee of any kind!



Potential DC Storage Security Threats



Mitigated by Fibre Channel SAN Security




FC-SP-2: What and Why?

- Why?: Need to transition SANs from Authorization and segmentation based FC security to authentication and encryption based security!
- What? FC-SP-2 is a ANSI/INCITS standard (2012) that defines protocols to –
 - Authenticate Fibre Channel entities
 - Setup session encryption keys
 - Negotiate parameters to ensure per frame integrity and confidentiality
 - Define and distribute security policies over FC
- Designed to protect against several classes of threats



FC-SP-2 and the FC Stack

- FC-SP-2 defines two security protocols that provide security services
 - ESP_Header (defined in FC-FS)
 - CT_Authentication (defined in FC-GS)
- Choose one:
 - ESP_Header
 - CT_Authentication
- RFC 4595 specifies FC AUTH protocol for IKEv2 key exchange





Key Terms

- Entities: Fibre Channel devices HBAs, Switches, end points
- Security Associations (SA): Shared security attributes (cryptographic algorithm, encryption key) between communicating entities
- **ESP_Header**: Protocol to provide security for FC data frames
- **CT_Authentication**: Protocol to provide security for FC control frames
- Re-play protection: Protocol to detect and reject old/duplicate packets to protect entity from replay attacks
- IKEv2: Internet Key Exchange v2 as defined for IPsec. RFC4595 specifies IKEv2 use for FC



Fabric Security Architecture

Components of FC-SP-2 Security Architecture

Authentication Infrastructure

• Secret, certificate, password and pre-shared key based architecture

Authentication

• Protocol to assure identify of communicating entities, negotiation of security requirement and protocol

Security Associations

• Protocol to establish Shared key between communicating entities, Based on IKEv2 (RFC4595)

Cryptographic Integrity and Confidentiality


• Frame by frame encryption, replay protection, origin authentication, ESP_Header or CT_Authentication

Authorization

• Fabric policies that control which entities can connect with each other, management access to the fabric



Generic Authentication Transaction



Embedded in the FC-SP-2 Protocol



Authentication Details

- Authentication Protocols for the Authentication Infrastructure
 - DH-CHAP
 - Secret-based authentication and key management protocol
 - Fibre Channel Certificate Authentication Protocol (FCAP)
 - x.509 certificate based authentication and key management protocol
 - Fibre Channel Password Authentication Protocol (FCPAP)
 - Password based Authentication and key management protocol that uses the SRP Algorithm (RFC 2945)
 - Fibre Channel Extensible Authentication Protocol (FCEAP)
 - The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) supports multiple authentication methods (RFC 3748)
 - The Security Association Management Protocol (IKEv2-AUTH)
 - When IKEv2 is used for both authentication and the establishment of a SA
- Authentication type
 - Secrets
 - Passwords
 - Certificates




Security Associations

- Subset of the IKEv2 protocol suitable for Fibre Channel establishes
 Security Associations (SA) between entities
- Traffic selectors specify what needs to be protected by the SA and what the protections are
- Two mechanisms are available to protect traffic
 - ESP_Header for FC-2 Frames to protect data
 - CT_Authentication is used to protect management traffic in the Fabric
- Each SA defines
 - SPI, Sequence Number counter, and parameters for the selected transforms
 - IKE_SA is used for secure SA management functions, Child_SAs secure FC traffic
- Security Association Database (SADB) stores the SAs
 - Includes the SA's SPI, a Sequence Number counter, and parameters for crypto graphic transforms for integrity, confidentiality, mode of operation, and keys




Authentication Protocols and SAs





Authentication Options

- Switch-to-Switch
 - Mutual authentication for a switch to join a Fabric
- Device-to-Switch
 - Mutual authentication for a device to connect to a Fabric
- Device-to-Device
 - Mutual authentication from one end device to another






Authorization (Access Control)

- Fabric policies provide basic authorization controls in the form of Access Control Lists
 - Policies that contain Fabric-wide data, distributed to every switch on the Fabric
 - Policies that contain per Switch data, sent to an individual switch
- Policy enforcement occurs when
 - A connection is attempted
 - A management application tries to access the management services of the Fabric
- Policy Check
 - When two switches join they ensure that policy information is the same



FC-SP-2 ESP_header

- ESP_header (optional) is a layer 2 security protocol that provides
 - Origin authentication
 - Integrity
 - Anti-replay protection
 - Confidentially
- Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) is defined in RFC 4303
- FC-FS-3 defines optional headers for Fibre Channel, FC-SP defines how to use ESP in Fibre Channel
- Similar protections exist for CT_Authentication






Managing Secrets, Passwords, and Certs

- For mutual authentication, each device needs to know the credentials of
 - The adjacent device
 - End nodes for end-to-end
- Manual configuration becomes difficult
 - 50,000 or more credentials are possible in large environments
- Options for managing credentials
 - RADIUS
 - KMIP
 - Public Certificate Authority
 - Internal Certificate Authority

Sharing the credentials of one device



DH-CHAP Credentials:





FC-SP-2

Benefits

- Supports in-band authentication and confidential traffic
- Supports creation of trusted fabrics and FC SAN Infrastructure
- Protects against certain operator errors and cable misconnections
- Improved scalability promised in new zoning approach
- Supports protecting data in-flight
- Supports checking of network configuration for multi-fabric environments

Standard conformance

- FC-SP requires DH-CHAP with NULL for authentication
- FC-SP-2 requires the support of AUTH-A Compliance Element (Annex A of FC-SP-2)
 - And the ability to re-authenticate



Aspects of Fibre Channel Security

- Physical security for the data center
- Securing management interfaces
- Encryption of data at rest
 - Disk, array, file, database
- Encryption of data in flight
 - DC to DC, End-to-End, hop by hop
- Negative impacts of encryption
- LUN Masking
- Zoning

- NPIV
- Security between data centers
- Proof of encryption
- Secret, password, and certificate management
- Vendor support
- And of course, FC-SP-2



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Scaling Fibre Channel

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 - 64GFC
 - FC Zoning Basics



Thank You

